Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies

Published:2017-02-20 Issue:4 Volume:46 Page:1015-1036
ISSN:0020-7276
Container-title:International Journal of Game Theory
language:en
Short-container-title:Int J Game Theory

Author:

Lombardi Michele,Yoshihara Naoki

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Subject

Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty,Economics and Econometrics,Social Sciences (miscellaneous),Mathematics (miscellaneous),Statistics and Probability

Link

http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00182-017-0568-8/fulltext.html

Reference31 articles.

1. Corchón L, Herrero C (2004) A decent proposal. Span Econ Rev 6:107–125

2. Bochet O (2007) Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence. Int J Game Theory 36:301–316

3. Doğan B (2014) Essays on mechanism design and implementation. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Rochester

4. Dutta B, Sen A (2012) Nash implementation with partially honest individuals. Games Econ Behav 74:154–169

5. Dutta B, Sen A, Vohra R (1995) Nash implementation through elementary mechanisms in economic environments. Econ Des 1:173–204

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