1. Boyer, M., and G. Dionne (1989), “An Empirical Analysis of Moral Hazard and Experience Rating”, Review of Economics and Statistics, 71, 128–13
2. Chassagnon, A. (1996), Sélection adverse: modèle générique et applications, PhD dissertation, DELTA.
3. Chassagnon, A. and P.A. Chiappori (1997), Insurance under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection: The Case of Pure Competition, Mimeo, DELTA.
4. Chiappori, P.A. (1994), Assurance et économétrie des contrats: quelques directions de recherche, Mimeo, DELTA.
5. Chiappori, P.A. and B. Salanié (1996), “Empirical Contract Theory: The Case of Insurance Data”, CREST DP9639, forthcoming in the European Economic Review.