1. Abney G., Lauth T.P. 1997. “The Item Veto and Fiscal Responsibility”. Journal of Poltics 59(3):882–892.
2. Alesina, Alberto, Ricardo Hausman, Rudolf Hommes, and Ernesto Stein. 1999. “Budget Institutions and Fiscal Performance in Latin America”. Journal of Development Economics 59:253–273.
3. Amorim Neto, Octavio. 2002. “Presidential Cabinets, Electoral Cycles, and Coaltion Discipline in Brazil” in Scott Morgenstern and Benito Nacif (eds.), Legislative Politics in Latin America. Cambridge University Press, pp. 48–78.
4. Archer, Ronald P. and Matthew S. Shugart. 1997. “The Unrealized Potential of Presidential Dominance in Colombia” in Matthew S. Shugart and Scott P. Mainwaring (eds.), Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 110–159.
5. Arriagada, Genaro and Carol Graham. 1994. “Chile: Sustaining Admustment During Democratic Transition” in Stephan Haggard and Steven B. Webb (eds.), Voting for Reform: Democracy, Liberalization, and Economic Adjustment. New York: The World Bank.