The Design of Institutions: An Agency Theory Perspective-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

The Design of Institutions: An Agency Theory Perspective

Published:1995 Issue: Volume: Page:17-36
ISSN:
Container-title:Institutional Design
language:
Short-container-title:

Author:

Banks Jeffrey S.

Publisher

Springer Netherlands

Link

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/978-94-011-0641-2_2.pdf

Reference12 articles.

1. Alchian, Armen and Harold Demsetz. (1972). “Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization.” American Economic Review 62(5): 777–795.

2. Grossman, Sanford and Oliver Hart. (1983). “An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem.” Econometrica 51(1): 7–45.

3. Harris, Milton and Arthur Raviv. (1979). “Optimal Incentive Contracts with Imperfect Information.” Journal of Economic Theory 20(2): 231–259.

4. Hart, Oliver and Bengt Holmstrom. (1986). “The Theory of Contracts.” In T. Bewley (ed.) Advances in Economie Theory (pp. 77–155). New York: Cambridge University Press.

5. Holmstrom, Bengt. (1979). “Moral Hazard and Observability.” Bell Journal of Economies 9(2): 74–91.

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