1. Alfred Tarski, ‘The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages’, in Logic, Semantics, Metamathematicsy Oxford 1956, pp. 152–278. The criterion is roughly Tarski’s Convention T that defines the concept of a truth-predicate.
2. The view that a characterization of a truth-predicate meeting Tarski’s criteria is the core of a theory of meaning is defended in my ‘Truth and Meaning’, Synthese 17 (1967) 304–323.
3. For documentation and details see my ‘Theories of Meaning and Learnable Languages’ in Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Proceedings of the 1964 International Congress (ed. by Yehoshua Bar-Hillel), Amsterdam 1965, pp. 388–390.
4. Word and Object, Cambridge, Mass., 1960, Chapt. VI. Hereafter numerals in parentheses refer to pages of this book.
5. R. Carnap, The Logical Syntax of Language’, London 1937, p. 248. The same was in effect proposed by P. T. Geach, Mental Acts, London 1957.