Abstract
AbstractA laboratory study was carried out to analyze the relationship between ambiguity regarding the sharing norms in structured alternating-offer bargaining and gender differences in bargaining. Symmetric environments, where a 50:50 split emerges as the unique sensible norm, showed the lowest ambiguity and gender differences are absent. We increased ambiguity by introducing asymmetries into the bargaining environment by making one bargaining party get a higher share than the other (due to empowerment, entitlement or informational asymmetries), but without imposing new sharing norms. In these situations, men are less likely to reach an agreement, but, when they do, they obtain a larger share of the pie. As a result, men and women show similar overall earnings but earnings are lower when bargaining with men. We find suggestive evidence that gender differences diminish when we reduce ambiguity regarding the sharing norms by providing information about other participants’ agreements in asymmetric environments.
Funder
Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades
The Research Council of Norway
Departamento de Educación, Política Linguística y Cultura, Gobierno Vasco
Universidad del País Vasco
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)
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