Abstract
AbstractA long tradition in philosophy and economics equates intelligence with the ability to act rationally—that is, to choose actions that can be expected to achieve one’s objectives. This framework is so pervasive within AI that it would be reasonable to call it the standard model. A great deal of progress on reasoning, planning, and decision-making, as well as perception and learning, has occurred within the standard model. Unfortunately, the standard model is unworkable as a foundation for further progress because it is seldom possible to specify objectives completely and correctly in the real world. The chapter proposes a new model for AI development in which the machine’s uncertainty about the true objective leads to qualitatively new modes of behavior that are more robust, controllable, and deferential to humans.
Funder
Verein zur Förderung des digitalen Humanismus
Publisher
Springer International Publishing
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