Abstract
AbstractStudies report an unexplained variation in physicians’ care. This variation may to some extent be explained by differences in their work motivation. However, empirical evidence on the link between physician motivation and care is scarce. We estimate the associations between different types of work motivation and care. Motivation is measured using validated questions from a nation-wide survey of Danish general practices and linked to high-quality register data on their care in 2019. Using a series of regression models, we find that more financially motivated practices generate more fee-for-services per patient, whereas practices characterised by greater altruistic motivation towards the patient serve a larger share of high-need patients and issue more prescriptions for antibiotics per patient. Practices with higher altruism towards society generate lower medication costs per patient and prescribe a higher rate of narrow-spectrum penicillin, thereby reducing the risk of antimicrobial resistance in the population. Together, our results suggest that practices’ motivation is associated with several dimensions of healthcare, and that both their financial motivation and altruism towards patients and society play a role. Policymakers should, therefore, consider targeting all provider motivations when introducing organisational changes and incentive schemes; for example, by paying physicians to adhere to clinical guidelines, while at the same time clearly communicating the guidelines’ value from both a patient and societal perspective.
Funder
Novo Nordisk Fonden
Helsefonden
The Committee of Multipractice Studies in General Practice under The Danish College of General Practice
University Library of Southern Denmark
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
Health Policy,Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)
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