Author:
Chowdhury Subhasish M.,Sheremeta Roman M.
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
Computer Science Applications,General Economics, Econometrics and Finance,General Social Sciences,Applied Psychology,Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous),Developmental and Educational Psychology,General Decision Sciences
Reference54 articles.
1. Alexeev, M., & Leitzel, J. (1996). Rent shrinking. Southern Economic Journal, 62, 620–626.
2. Amaldoss, W., & Rapoport, A. (2009). Excessive expenditure in two-stage contests: Theory and experimental evidence. In F. Columbus (Ed.), Game theory: Strategies, equilibria, and theorems. Hauppauge, NY: Nova Science.
3. Amegashie, J. A. (1999). The number of rent-seekers and aggregate rent-seeking expenditures: An unpleasant result. Public Choice, 99, 57–62.
4. Baron, D., & Myerson, R. (1982). Regulating a monopolist with unknown costs. Econometrica, 50, 911–930.
5. Baye, M., Kovenock, D., & de Vries, C. G. (2005). Comparative analysis of litigation systems: An auction-theoretic approach. Economic Journal, 115, 583–601.
Cited by
20 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献，注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献，订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献