1. Paul R. Milgrom 美国 Stanford University 2006美国科学院院士 ;2020诺贝尔经济学奖 auctions and bidding - a primer
2. Paul R. Milgrom 美国 Stanford University 2006美国科学院院士 ;2020诺贝尔经济学奖 distributional strategies for games with incomplete information
3. Susan Athey 美国 Stanford University 2012美国科学院院士 Peaches, lemons, and cookies: Designing auction markets with dispersed information
4. eva Tardos 美国 Cornell University 2007美国工程院院士;2013美国科学院院士 Information Asymmetries in Common-Value Auctions with Discrete Signals
5. Stephen Morris 美国 Massachusetts Institute of Technology 2021美国科学院院士 Revenue Guarantee Equivalence
6. Stephen Morris 美国 Massachusetts Institute of Technology 2021美国科学院院士 first-price auctions with general information structures: implications for bidding and revenue
7. Drew Fudenberg 美国 Massachusetts Institute of Technology 2014美国科学院院士 Behavior-Based Price Discrimination and Customer Recognition
8. Bergemann, Dirk 美国 Yale University Revenue Guarantee Equivalence
9. Thomas J,Chemmanur 美国 Boston College How Should a Firm Go Public? A Dynamic Model of the Choice between Fixed-Price Offerings and Auction..
10. Bergemann, Dirk 美国 Yale University First-Price Auctions with General Information Structures: A Short Introduction
11. Bergemann, Dirk 美国 Yale University first-price auctions with general information structures: implications for bidding and revenue
12. Peter E.D,Love 澳大利亚 Curtin University Deriving Optimal Competition in Infrastructure Procurement
13. Harrison, Glenn W. 南非 University of Cape Town Naturally occurring markets and exogenous laboratory experiments: A case study of the winner's curse
14. List, John A. 美国 University of Chicago Naturally occurring markets and exogenous laboratory experiments: A case study of the winner's curse
15. Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni 美国 IMF Can cost increases increase competition? Asymmetric information and equilibrium prices
16. John, Kose 美国 LEONARD North STERN School BUSINESS Privatization as an agency problem: Auctions versus private negotiations
17. Hong, Harrison 美国 Columbia University Econometric models of asymmetric ascending auctions
18. NARASIMHAN,JEGADEESH 美国 University of California LOS ANGELES An analysis of bidding in the Japanese Government Bond auctions
19. Laffont, Jean Jacques 美国 University of Southern California Game theory and empirical economics: The case of auction data
20. Laffont, Jean Jacques 美国 University of Southern California Structural analysis of auction data