Envy-Free Mechanisms with Minimum Number of Cuts
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Published:2017-02-10
Issue:1
Volume:31
Page:
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ISSN:2374-3468
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Container-title:Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
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language:
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Short-container-title:AAAI
Author:
Alijani Reza,Farhadi Majid,Ghodsi Mohammad,Seddighin Masoud,Tajik Ahmad
Abstract
We study the problem of fair division of a heterogeneous resource among strategic players. Given a divisible heterogeneous cake, we wish to divide the cake among n players in a way that meets the following criteria: (I) every player(weakly) prefers his allocated cake to any other player’s share (such notion is known as envy-freeness), (II) the mechanism is strategy-proof (truthful), and (III) the number of cuts made on the cake is minimal. We provide methods, namely expansion process and expansion process with unlocking, for dividing the cake under different assumptions on the valuation functions of the players.
Publisher
Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)
Cited by
2 articles.
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1. On Existence of Truthful Fair Cake Cutting Mechanisms;Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation;2022-07-12
2. Efficient Fair Division with Minimal Sharing;Operations Research;2022-05