Author:
Cavallo Ruggiero,Jain Shaili
Abstract
We study winner-take-all contests for crowdsourcing procurement in a model of costly effort and stochastic production. The principal announces a prize value P, agents simultaneously select a level of costly effort to exert towards production, yielding stochastic quality results, and then the agent who produces the highest quality good is paid P by the principal. We derive conditions on the probabilistic mapping from effort to quality under which this contest paradigm yields efficient equilibrium outcomes, and demonstrate that the conditions are satisfied in a range of canonical settings.
Publisher
Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)
Cited by
5 articles.
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1. Costly information providing in binary contests;Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence;2024-07-27
2. Contest partitioning in binary contests;Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems;2024-02-27
3. Obtaining and Providing Partial Information in Binary Contests;2022 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Joint Conference on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology (WI-IAT);2022-11
4. A Team Crowdsourcing Method Combining Competition and Collaboration;2022 IEEE Intl Conf on Dependable, Autonomic and Secure Computing, Intl Conf on Pervasive Intelligence and Computing, Intl Conf on Cloud and Big Data Computing, Intl Conf on Cyber Science and Technology Congress (DASC/PiCom/CBDCom/CyberSciTech);2022-09-12
5. Efficient and adaptive incentive selection for crowdsourcing contests;Applied Intelligence;2022-08-06