Author:
Kerkmann Anna Maria,Lang Jérôme,Rey Anja,Rothe Jörg,Schadrack Hilmar,Schend Lena
Abstract
We propose a new representation setting for hedonic games, where each agent partitions the set of other agents into friends, enemies, and neutral agents, with friends and enemies being ranked. Under the assumption that preferences are monotonic (respectively, antimonotonic) with respect to the addition of friends (respectively, enemies), we propose a bipolar extension of the responsive extension principle, and use this principle to derive the (partial) preferences of agents over coalitions. Then, for a number of solution concepts, we characterize partitions that necessarily or possibly satisfy them, and we study the related problems in terms of their complexity.
Cited by
7 articles.
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