Metric-Distortion Bounds under Limited Information

Author:

Anagnostides Ioannis,Fotakis Dimitris,Patsilinakos Panagiotis

Abstract

In this work, we study the metric distortion problem in voting theory under a limited amount of ordinal information. Our primary contribution is threefold. First, we consider mechanisms that perform a sequence of pairwise comparisons between candidates. We show that a popular deterministic mechanism employed in many knockout phases yields distortion O(log m) while eliciting only m − 1 out of the Θ(m2 ) possible pairwise comparisons, where m represents the number of candidates. Our analysis for this mechanism leverages a powerful technical lemma developed by Kempe (AAAI ‘20). We also provide a matching lower bound on its distortion. In contrast, we prove that any mechanism which performs fewer than m−1 pairwise comparisons is destined to have unbounded distortion. Moreover, we study the power of deterministic mechanisms under incomplete rankings. Most notably, when agents provide their k-top preferences we show an upper bound of 6m/k + 1 on the distortion, for any k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m}. Thus, we substantially improve over the previous bound of 12m/k established by Kempe (AAAI ‘20), and we come closer to matching the best-known lower bound. Finally, we are concerned with the sample complexity required to ensure near-optimal distortion with high probability. Our main contribution is to show that a random sample of Θ(m/ϵ2 ) voters suffices to guarantee distortion 3 + ϵ with high probability, for any sufficiently small ϵ > 0. This result is based on analyzing the sensitivity of the deterministic mechanism introduced by Gkatzelis, Halpern, and Shah (FOCS ‘20). Importantly, all of our sample-complexity bounds are distribution-independent. From an experimental standpoint, we present several empirical findings on real-life voting applications, comparing the scoring systems employed in practice with a mechanism explicitly minimizing (metric) distortion. Interestingly, for our case studies, we find that the winner in the actual competition is typically the candidate who minimizes the distortion.

Publisher

AI Access Foundation

Subject

Artificial Intelligence

Cited by 1 articles. 订阅此论文施引文献 订阅此论文施引文献,注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献,订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献

1. Best of Both Distortion Worlds;Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation;2023-07-07

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