Abstract
We consider the problem of allocating fairly a set of indivisible goods among agents from the point of view of compact representation and computational complexity. We start by assuming that agents have dichotomous preferences expressed by propositional formulae. We express efficiency and envy-freeness in a logical setting, which reveals unexpected connections to nonmonotonic reasoning. Then we identify the complexity of determining whether there exists an efficient and envy-free allocation, for several notions of efficiency, when preferences are represented in a succinct way (as well as restrictions of this problem). We first study the problem under the assumption that preferences are dichotomous, and then in the general case.
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