Information Sharing in a Green Supply Chain with a Common Retailer

Abstract

In the paper, we analyze the problem of information sharing in a green supply chain with two competing manufacturers selling environmentally friendly substitutable products in markets through a common retailer. We develop a game-theoretic framework of a network supply chain structure. The study shows that (a) the manufacturer is better off while the retailer is worse off when the retailer shares his private information with the manufacturer; (b) the equilibrium greening levels are the highest when both the manufacturers are informed; (c) under intense competition, the retailer has an incentive to share the information with the manufacturer; (d) the equilibrium greening levels decrease with information inaccuracy. This study shows the existence of a contracting mechanism the manufacturers can employ to induce information sharing. This study’s results will be helpful to managers of green supply chain structures to make marketing and operational decisions under uncertain situations. The main contribution of this study is that it explores the problem of information sharing in a green supply chain under competition.