A Stackelberg Game Theoretic Driver Model for Merging

Abstract

Merging is one of the important issues in studying roadway traffic. Merging disturbs the mainline of traffic, which reduces the efficiency or capacity of the highway system. In this paper, we have considered the application of a Stackelberg game theory to a driver behavior model in a merging situation. In this model, the so-called payoffs that reflect the drivers’ aggressiveness affect the decision to proceed to merge and whether to accelerate or decelerate in the game theoretic framework. These merging behaviors in turn impact the mainline traffic, which may lead to a variety of influences, such as collisions or reduced roadway throughput. Consequently, this impact depends on the level of aggressiveness of the driver merging in and those in the mainline, which results in both longitudinal and lateral disturbances in the mainline due to their interaction.