Hupolêpsis, Doxa, and Epistêmê in Aristotle

Abstract

In Aristotle's views on cognition a series of terms –  hupolêpsis, doxa, and epistêmê – play key roles. But it has not been noticed that each of these comes in two kinds – one unqualified ( haplôs) and the other qualified. When these and their interrelations are properly explored, a deeply systematic picture of cognition emerges, in which doxa is best understood as ‘belief’, hupolêpsis as ‘supposition’, and epistêmê (‘scientific knowledge’) as a sort of belief, so that – contrary to orthodoxy – we can have belief and knowledge of the same things at the same time. Many of these conclusions are shown to mark a continuity with Plato, in that neither thinker, it is argued, holds a so-called ‘two-worlds’ picture of cognition.