Abstract
ABSTRACTDiversity of opinion both presents problems and affords opportunities. Differences of opinion can stand in the way of reaching an agreement within a group on what decisions to take. But at the same time, the fact that the differences in question could derive from access to different information or from the exercise of different judgemental skills means that they present individuals with the opportunity to improve their own opinions. This paper explores the implications for solutions to the former (aggregation) problem of supposing that individuals exploit these opportunities. In particular, it argues that rational individual revision of opinion implies that aggregation problems are unstable in a certain sense and that solving them by exploiting the information embedded in individual opinion has profound implications for the conditions that we should impose on aggregation procedures.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Subject
History and Philosophy of Science
Reference22 articles.
1. Combining Probability Distributions: A Critique and Annotated Bibliography;Genest;Statistical Science,1986
2. Interpersonal Comparability and Social Choice Theory
3. Rational Consensus in Science and Society
4. Dietrich F. and List C. (forthcoming) “Arrow's Theorem in Judgement Aggregation”, Social Choice and Welfare
5. Consensus through respect: A model of rational group decision-making
Cited by
11 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献,注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献,订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献