Prioritizing domestic demand: from idea to effects

Abstract

Under sanctions, at the state level (in particular via the Russian antimonopoly authority) the idea of the need to prioritize supply to the domestic market is being promoted as an imperative for Russian manufacturers. The reverse side of the prioritization of the domestic market is the refusal to link prices under domestic contracts to foreign price indicators and exchange rates. The requirement to prioritize the internal market is as simple and obvious in concept as it is difficult to administer. We assess the design of the norm and possible scenarios for its application in terms of effects both for Russian business entities and for public welfare in general. We propose options for fine-tuning in terms of the application of this norm. We show that the preferred methods for analyzing the satisfaction of domestic demand are economic and statistical methods, as opposed to survey methods, which are associated with high risks of strategic behavior on the part of consumers. Additionally, we outline the main risks associated with the administration of the priority of meeting domestic demand through antimonopoly regulation. Among these risks, the most important are the risk of involvement of the antimonopoly authority in the resolution of economic disputes (which contradicts not only the essence of antimonopoly policy, but also the existing regulatory documents), as well as the risk of side effects that cannot be systematically taken into account and adjusted for in conditions where the prioritization domestic demand is provided not by methods of economic regulation, but by antitrust measures.