Affiliation:
1. School of History, Politics and International Relations, University of Leicester, Leicester, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
Abstract
China and Russia have a demonstrable record of coordinating their votes at the United Nations Security Council over the past 12 years. China, in particular, has coordinated its vetoes to align with Russia, while Russia still uses its veto in isolation of other states, except for Chinese abstentions. It is widely acknowledged in the literature on Chinese–Russian foreign relations that the two states are in a strategic partnership; however, there is open debate as to how long this partnership can be sustained. Both China and Russia seem to value the partnership, but trust-building is needed to sustain it due to the growing power imbalance between them. One way that trust can be built is through costly signalling, which provides reassurances to the receiving state that the signaller has benign intentions. This article argues that China is engaged in costly signalling to Russia by aligning its votes with Moscow at the expense of angering the other permanent members of the Security Council—the United States, France and the United Kingdom—which in turn sours the relations between them. China is attempting to reassure Russia, the weaker partner, that it still values their friendship, and Russia has reciprocated by relying more on China.
Subject
Political Science and International Relations,Development,Geography, Planning and Development
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