That Day on River Valley and the Discovery of Presence

Abstract

This article serves as an introduction to the notion of “presence,” as described by Runia, and applies this concept to our understandings of memory, particularly involuntary memory, and personal experience. Presence is understood as the way the past resides in the present, but is unrepresented, outside of the usual venues of textual or visual representation. The discovery of presence—such as in the experience of involuntary memories—leads us to ask, “who are we that we have memory?” Questioning along ontological lines, memory is reformulated from the standpoint of being-in-the-world. In a vein not unlike Proust’s Remembrance of Things Past, this article presents a discussion of presence interwoven with first person narrative segments. It is suggested that presence works through metonymy, where meanings are revealed (viz. alethia) when a combination of factors, including time, contextual cues, and other meanings interconnect. It is concluded that memory is contained in the world, not just in the head, and further consideration of the ontology of memory, subjectivity, and their grounding in the world is warranted. Transcendence and personal growth are based on our ability to confront presence in our lives and to make meaningful connections that we evolve with or beyond.