Mindfulness and the Paradoxes in Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology

Abstract

Although some claim that phenomenology and mindfulness have much in common, others hold that these comparisons are based on a flawed understanding of Husserl’s phenomenological reduction. This article addresses the debate on the alleged similarities and differences between phenomenology and mindfulness practice. It first illustrates the differences by contrasting a pair of key ideas in Husserl’s philosophy and in Kabat-Zinn’s conception of mindfulness, respectively, that appear to be similar, but turn out to be quite different: the natural attitude versus the mind’s natural tendency. A Merleau-Pontian turn is then proposed, away from Husserl’s philosophy, toward the paradoxes which Merleau-Ponty regards as inherent to the phenomenological reduction and the phenomenon of expression. This article claims that it is not so much the phenomenological reduction as such that resembles mindfulness practice, but that a more helpful comparison can be found in their shared paradoxes: the paradox of productive unachievability and the paradox of expression. In the end, it is discussed how these shared paradoxes matter for the debate on phenomenology and mindfulness.