Presidents and Generals: Systems of Government and the Selection of Defense Ministers

Abstract

Defense ministers are among the most central players in democracies’ civil–military relations. This article aims to identify the determinants of the selection criteria of defense ministers in democracies and semi-democracies. More specifically, it attempts to measure the effects of systems of government on decisions to appoint civilians or military officers to head the defense ministry. We argue that some characteristics of presidentialized regimes lead to the appointment of military defense ministers. This is a novel contribution, one that connects the literature on civil–military relations and that on systems of government. To assess our hypothesis and its mechanisms, we use comprehensive cross-national data in 1975–2015. Our tests indicate a robust association between presidentialized systems of government and the appointment of military ministers. We also show that military defense ministers are associated with some relevant outcomes. These findings have important implications for the study of civil–military relations, defense policy, and democracy.