The Sri Lanka Peace Process

Abstract

In the wake of a new wave of violence in Sri Lanka and the classification by numerous Western countries of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) as a terrorist organisation, many wonder if the agreement mediated by Norway between the government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE has any long-term chance of success. This review will analyse the different strategies and proposals elaborated in previous agreements and peace talks designed to end the conflict between the government of Sri Lanka and the Tamil minority, with the purpose of identifying whether the current ceasefire agreement has a chance of lasting and leading to a peaceful and durable resolution of the conflict. The changing nature of the Tamils' requests and the government's proposals from the independence of Ceylon until the present will be considered, along with the causes of their evolution, the reasons why certain proposals were accepted or rejected, and the major obstacles preventing a successful agreement from being reached. The study of the 1957, 1965, 1984, 1985, 1987, 1989 and 1995 failing agreements, as well as the changing context in which they were abandoned or modified, will lead to the conclusion that the United Nations should take on a bigger role in the peace process if it wants the ceasefire to be successfully implemented and lead to a permanent peace. The United Nations could enhance its role by pressuring both sides to increase the pace and the commitment to negotiation, by accepting to monitor the ceasefire, or by announcing retribution for both sides in case of non-compliance. In the absence of UN involvement, the current ceasefire will not only have little chance of evolving into long-lasting peace for Sri Lanka, but could also exacerbate the conflict by allowing both parties to regroup and increase their fighting capabilities.