Dynamic game analysis of hybrid strategy of enterprise fulfilling social responsibility

Abstract

In order to analyze the game relationship of corporate social responsibility, this paper uses evolutionary game theory to construct the dynamic game of mixed strategy by using government supervision, enterprises and the public as the main body of the three-party game. The results show that in the tripartite game, the more the expected revenue of government departments, enterprises, and the public increases, the more likely it is that the government departments will adopt a strict supervision strategy and the company will choose to assume social responsibility. The higher the cost of government supervision, the higher the cost of corporate social responsibility, and the more the loss of social welfare. Then the government department adopts a general regulatory strategy, and the company chooses not to assume social responsibility, the more likely the public will give negative evaluation of the company. The conclusion is that the strict supervision of the government supervision department has greatly increased the penalty ‘cost of enterprises’ failure to perform social responsibility. This helps enterprises to consciously perform social responsibility, and thus get positive comments from the public.