Rule-Scepticism and the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge

Abstract

This paper revisits the 1992 debate between David Bloor and Michael Lynch over the importance of Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations for social studies of science. Lynch defended four points: (1) Bloor is committed to a rule-sceptical reading of Wittgenstein; (2) this reading is similar to that proposed by Kripke in 1982; (3) the criticism levelled previously against Kripke also applies to Bloor; (4) the problems besetting Bloor’s rule-scepticism undermine his project of a causal-explanatory sociology of scientific knowledge. This paper takes issue with all four points. Concerning (1) and (2) this paper emphasizes that Bloor explicitly rejects Kripke’s rule-scepticism in his 1997 book on Wittgenstein and rule-following. It is argued here that Bloor was wrong to do so. Bloor’s meaning-finitism is an unsatisfactory answer to the meaning-sceptical challenge posed in Kripke’s work. As concerns (3), this paper answers the criticism that Gordon Baker and Peter Hacker have directed against Kripke. This is important since Baker and Hacker’s criticism is given a particularly prominent position in Lynch’s attack on Bloor. Finally, regarding (4), it is shown that Bloor’s unsatisfactory treatment of rule-scepticism does not undermine his project for a causal-explanatory sociology of scientific knowledge.