Class Dominance or Fracturing? Sources of Broad Interest in Lobbying by Fortune 500 Corporations

Abstract

Are large corporations able to transcend individual self-interest in favor of a broad class interest, as suggested by class dominance theorists? Or, has the corporate elite become fractured? We address this ongoing debate through a unique case: the determinants of the breadth of corporate lobbying of the U.S. federal government. As predicted by the fracturing thesis, we find that financial companies no longer have a broader political interest than nonfinancial companies. However, we also find that mechanisms still exist that foster a broader class-wide interest. Specifically, a firm’s embeddedness in the interlocking directorate and policy-planning networks is associated with broader lobbying activities. Finally, we find support for the hypothesis that the interests of large corporations have become more globalized: firms with more global operations have greater breadth of lobbying activities. We therefore theorize that while banks no longer play the same role in diffusing a broadened interest through the capitalist class, alternative mechanisms continue to fulfill this role. Together, these findings demonstrate continued support for the class dominance thesis, even in the light of any fracturing of the corporate elite.