Cognition and Emotion

Abstract

In much of the debate concerning the philosophy and psychology of cognition and emotion, Aristotle’s theory is taken to support a functionalist, cognition-first account. This brand of functionalism emphasizes functional role over occupant, or supervenient over physiochemical, the so-called ‘software vs hardware’ distinction. We argue, instead, that this functionalist reading misrepresents Aristotle because it downgrades the significance of his ideas about the biological bases of emotions and, in particular, affect-first processes in emotions. In addition to presenting a detailed critique of this functionalist interpretation of Aristotelian psychology, we offer an alternative reading of Aristotle’s theory of cognition and emotion that brings to bear certain biological considerations evidenced in his arguments on the integration of form and matter (hylomorphism) and the hierarchical organization of the biological world. Based on this new reading, we identify affinities with contemporary research in the cognitive neuroscience of emotion and developmental research on emotion.