Abstract
Whether or not intentional actions initiated and formed by free will exist, it can be shown that lack of belief in such behavior makes people behave less ethically and less law-abidingly (they cheat more). Therefore, this phenomenon—often called a necessary illusion—is crucial to moral as well as legal social-life-forming activities. However, societal coherence based on this kind of illusion is indeed very fragile, and thus we would be better off if we could prove that the quality of free will in intentional activity is more than a convenient illusion. This article presents an interdisciplinary model within the domain of criminal law and psychology explaining human intentional actions based on a scientific notion of free will as a real-world phenomenon.
Subject
History and Philosophy of Science,General Psychology
Cited by
7 articles.
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