Heuristics and Biases in Theory Formation

Abstract

Scientific growth is described, in evolutionist terms, as a two stage process involving a rather loose stage of theory creation and a subsequent, much tighter process of theory testing. Scientific methodology is largely confined to the latter stage, while the creative process of theory formation is less amenable to systematization. Four variants or heuristics of theoretical thinking are outlined and interpreted within the evolution analogy: deductive reasoning, empirical generalization, metaphorical reasoning and ordinary-language games. Most attention is devoted to the last variant, which seems to be especially prominent in the cognitivist approach and which highlights the fact that theorists are subject to the same semantically based heuristics and biases as lay people. The facets of theory formation through ordinary-language games are illustrated and elaborated with reference to the availability heuristic in general and an availability account of illusory correlations in particular. Throughout this essay it is argued that specific variants of theory formation are associated with characteristic problems and assets, but that successful and fruitful theories emerge from all four sources, largely independent of how rationally the theory has been derived or inferred.