Science or not, conceptual problems remain: Seeking conceptual clarity around “psychology as a science” debates

Abstract

We argue that the question, “Should psychology follow the methods and principles of the natural sciences?” is not one that should be answered by theoretical psychologists or metascientists; rather, we implore psychological researchers themselves to heed Wittgenstein’s observation that a preoccupation with method and principles risks overlooking important conceptual issues, the clarification of which are necessarily antecedent to consideration of empirical activities. We examine potential conceptual problems that arise when psychological researchers attempt to follow natural science methods and principles without first considering the concepts that are relevant to their scientific pursuits. Drawing primarily from the works of Hacker, Lamiell, and Maraun, we argue against the dogmatic following of any methods or sets of principles. Instead, we posit that natural science methods and principles should be considered on a case-by-case basis after relevant psychological concepts have been carefully considered and empirical investigation has been deemed an appropriate path forward.