Abstract
Andersonian realism is a determinist, empiricist position that acknowledges the important distinction between qualities and relations. However, Anderson's `mind as feeling' thesis, proposing that the mind's qualities are emotional, is problematic since it fails to account for `feelings' themselves. O'Neil's (1934) alternative relational account of affects, in conjunction with Maze's (1983) theory of instinctual drives, provides a coherent platform for developing a comprehensive realist account of affects. In discussing the relation between affects, cognition and motivation, affects are viewed as drive-evaluative phenomena, and `feelings' are known bodily states arising in conjunction with motivationally driven environmental evaluations. The role that affects play in a revised desire/belief model of behaviour explanation is discussed.
Subject
History and Philosophy of Science,General Psychology
Reference75 articles.
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