Phenomenology and natural science: What kind of a discipline is psychology?

Abstract

The historical representation of natural science as the experimental testing of causal hypotheses with reductionistic, mechanistic explanations has been rightly rejected as an exclusive approach for psychology. However, this representation of science is simplistic and misleading. Interdisciplinary science studies show how biology, physics, and empirical psychology include reflection, empathy, imagination, qualitative analysis, and the creative use of ordinary language in natural scientific practice. Beyond causal experimentation in research and mechanistic explanation in theory, practices across all sciences include intentionality, meaning, holism, values, teleology, temporality, and agency in phenomena. Psychophysical subject matter requires unique methodological norms that interrelate intentional meanings and their external physical, vital, and social realities. Understanding psychology’s complex relation to natural science begs for a closer, more probing, comparative examination of the actual practices of scientists. Only on this basis will methodological norms adequately clarify, justify, and integrate the diverse, pluralistic approach required by psychology’s paradoxical identity.