Human Kinds and Looping Effects in Psychology

Abstract

Recent work in the historiography of psychology has suggested that the discipline must be seen as involved in the constitution of its own subject matter. Two questions arise. First, what does this tell us about the subject matter of psychology? Second, how should we understand and investigate the processes through which such ‘making up people’ occurs? This article addresses these questions by arguing, first, that psychological categories refer to human rather than natural kinds. In contrast to natural kinds, human kinds can exert effects on themselves. Then two different approaches to the ‘looping effect of human kinds’ are sketched: a Foucauldian analytics of the techne of psychology, and a hermeneutic understanding of humans as self-interpreting beings. It is argued that Foucault’s perspective, while rich in its critical potentials, lacks an adequate understanding of those values and meanings which are a part of human practical life.