Does the brain “initiate” freely willed processes? A philosophy of science critique of Libet-type experiments and their interpretation

Abstract

In the extensive, recent debates on free will, the pioneering experiments by Benjamin Libet continue to play a significant role. It is often claimed that these experiments demonstrate the illusory nature of freely willed actions. In this article, we provide a detailed analysis and evaluation of Libet’s experiments from a philosophy of science perspective. Our analysis focuses on Libet’s central notion of the “initiation” of freely willed processes by the brain. We examine four interpretations of the notion of initiation: in terms of a cause, a necessary condition, a correlation, and a regular succession. We argue that none of these four interpretations can be supported by the design and results of Libet’s experiments. In addition, we analyze two recent Libet-type experiments. Our general conclusion is that neither Libet’s original experiments nor later Libet-type experiments can justify the claim that allegedly freely willed processes are in fact initiated by the brain.