How Do Money and Time Restrictions Influence Self-Constraining Behavior in Polluting the Commons?

Abstract

Commons are resources shared by a group of people, and are studied using the commons dilemma paradigm. Despite Hardin’s prediction that the only sustainable management options are government regulation or private ownership, sustainable commons management has been observed with unregulated groups; however, global commons such as the atmosphere and oceans seem to conform to the prediction of “tragedy” because self-interests among users lead to degradation of the commons through overuse. The present study examined whether the factors of commons type (consumption or waste disposal) and cost (money or time) influence individual self-constraint in harvesting/polluting decisions to prolong the longevity of the shared resource, in the absence of social communication. Results indicate an interaction of the two factors: Individual self-constraint was greatest with the combination of disposal commons and time cost. These findings suggest that creative strategies to manage global commons may be possible, at least for waste-disposal commons.