Affiliation:
1. School of Petroleum Management, PDPU Campus, Raisan, Gandhinagar, Gujarat, India.
Abstract
In this paper, we show that there does not exist any triple acyclic preference aggregation rule that satisfies Majority property, weak Pareto criterion and a version of a property due to Alan Taylor. We also show that there are non-dictatorial preference aggregation rules and in particular non-dictatorial social welfare functions which satisfy the weak Pareto criterion and Taylor’s Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. Further, we are able to obtain analogous results for preference aggregation functionals by suitably adjusting the desired properties to fit into a framework which uses individual utility functions rather than individual preference orderings. Our final result is a modest generalisation of Sen’s version of Arrow’s impossibility theorem which is shown to hold under our mild domain restriction. JEL: D71
Cited by
2 articles.
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