`From Lambs to Lions'

Abstract

This article argues that increasingly widespread proliferation of nuclear and delivery system capabilities to smaller states represents a fundamental redistribution of power in the international system away from Great Power dominance — forever altering the traditional `power politics' relationship between states first described by Thucydides. Building upon the broader security studies literature, the rapidly evolving nuclear security relationships between states in the international system are discussed and a new theoretical framework for explaining them is proposed. This new framework outlines in detail several factors critical to shaping interstate security relationships: (1) the nuclear capabilities of the state (i.e., size, differentiation, range, and interceptibility of force structure); (2) the survivability of its arsenal (i.e., redundancy, mobility, site defense, subterfuge characteristics of forces); and (3) the credibility of its nuclear threat to the decision-makers in the target nation (i.e., perception by target of opponent's capability, survivability, control over situation, and threat to central/peripheral state interests). These characteristics combine to create a variety of nuclear security relationships between states (realpolitik, nascent/local, regional, and great power) which affect the deterrent ability, crisis stability, and available nuclear strategies of small nuclear states. Finally, both the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Gulf War are discussed in order to underscore the continuing evolution of Great Power-small state nuclear security relationships. In particular, the Gulf War is argued to provide strong support for the argument that future small nuclear states will be able to deter Great Power threats because of four critical lessons demonstrated by that conflict: (1) the effectiveness and survivability of covert nuclear weapons programs; (2) the effectiveness and survivability of small state delivery systems; (3) the ineffectiveness of strategic defense systems in intercepting potential attacks; and (4) the fact that threats of unconventional weapon use by small states are taken seriously by Great Powers.