Majority rule dynamics between a double coalition and a third opinion: coalition profit models and majority coalition ties

Abstract

This article explores the opinion dynamics of a double coalition opinion against a third opinion under majority rule updates on odd fixed size connected groups. For this purpose, coalition benefit criteria and three opinion formation models which extend the 2-state majority rule model on lattices are introduced. The proposed models focus on the coalition profit of its constituent coalition opinions and cover the possible final scenarios from coalition alliance perspective: either minor opinion or major opinion is favored, or dynamics do not favor to any coalition opinion. Opinion exchanges take place on a torus embedded lattice network of a 3-state system having in consideration tie configurations and two rules to break them: either by random choice or leaving ties unaltered. Models were analyzed in the statistical mechanics spirit through Monte Carlo simulations without node replacement. Estimations for coalition benefits, the growth of coalition ties, and consensus probabilities are reported. The loss of coalition strengths due to coalition ties and its indecision is indicated. In particular, the logistic decay of consensus probability is due to the logistic adaptive growth of coalition ties. Scaling behaviors for consensus time and coalition ties in terms of network size are suggested. The results of numerical simulations are discussed in the context of social influence and social dynamics.