Tourist Aviation Emissions: A Problem of Collective Action

Abstract

While transportation currently accounts for 23% of total global energy-related CO2 emissions, transport emissions are projected to double by 2050, driven significantly by continued high growth in global passenger demand for air travel. Addressing high growth in aviation emissions is critical to climate stabilization. Currently we rely on individual decisions to forego air travel as the means of reducing these high-risk emissions. In this paper we argue that encouraging voluntary responses to such risks cannot succeed because of the nature of human reason and the structure of the problem itself. We use decision-making theory to explore why individuals have been generally unwilling or unable to act upon these risks, and collective action theory to illustrate the futility of relying on uncoordinated actors in such cases. Participation in the high-carbon air travel regime is a social convention, and transition from social conventions requires coordination among players. Our theoretical discussions lead us to conclude that it is our moral duty to promote coordinated collective action, via national or global policy mechanisms, to address tourist aviation emissions. We offer various avenues of future research to advance this moral duty.