Do Hegemonic-Party Regimes Reward or Punish Voters? A Tale of Distributive Politics in Tanzania

Abstract

Does resource allocation by the central government to local governments in Tanzania favour opposition or the ruling party's strongholds? The literature advances two opposing theories – electoral competition and hegemonic party hypotheses. We use unique data on fiscal transfers and human resource allocations to investigate the effect of electoral support on government allocations. Contrary to the two hypotheses, we find no political bias in fiscal resources transferred to local governments. Similarly, we find no strong evidence to suggest any political bias in human resource allocation. On the whole, neither does the evidence confirm nor conclusively disconfirm the two hypotheses. The findings imply that hegemonic-parties do not necessarily opt for a discriminative strategy in intergovernmental resource allocations even after facing a threatening opposition. Flexibility in autocratic menu and the path dependence of government's social policy are likely to explain this kind of hegemonic party's allocative behaviour.