Affiliation:
1. Central Michigan University
2. Westminster College
Abstract
In this article, it is suggested that the new collective bargaining agreement (CBA) in the National Basketball Association (NBA) redistributes rents from the superstars back to the median voters. In particular, it is suggested that portions of the new agreement, such as salary caps, are designed to improve the rather skewed distribution of salaries in the NBA. Evidence from a Lorenz curve analysis of the first 2 years under the new contract suggests that all players with salaries below the median wage gain from the new agreement, and those with salaries closest to the median wage gain the most. The analysis suggests that skewed salary distributions may lead to CBAs that redistribute the rents from the rich (superstars) to the poor (median voters).
Subject
Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)
Cited by
21 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献,注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献,订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献