Abstract
This article examines the incentive effects of different payoff structures in the National Hockey League. A rule change prior to the 1999-2000 season, which changed the way that teams were awarded points in overtime games, provides a natural experiment to test the reaction of teams to a change in the payoff structure. The rule change had the desired effect of increasing excitement during overtime play. This article shows, however, that the rule also had the effect of increasing the frequency of overtime games, an effect predictable from the change in incentives but one not intended by the league.
Subject
Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)
Cited by
20 articles.
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