`Objective' Interests and the Sociology of Power

Abstract

In the first section of this paper I note a parallel between certain problems generated by Steven Lukes's `three-dimensional' view of power, and what I call the `paradox of emancipation' in certain traditions of Marxist thought. Lukes's critique of what he calls the `one' and `two-dimensional' views of power is next reviewed, and Lukes's own `three-dimensional' view subjected to analysis and criticism. Lukes's definition of power in terms of interests is identified as a major source of difficulty, and three distinct ways of constructing a distinction between `real' interests and `subjective' interests, or preferences are identified in Lukes's work. In the fourth section of the paper I present an alternative conception, or `view' of power which, I argue, sustains the essential features of Lukes's critique of the one- and two-dimensional views, but which, by severing the definitional tie between power and interests, avoids the value dependence of Lukes's own view of power. Finally, I make explicit a view of interests which runs counter to that which, I hold, Lukes, Connolly, et al. have in common with more orthodox political scientists. I go on to indicate the place of this concept in the formation and re-formation of personal and social identities, and briefly indicate its bearing on what I earlier called the `paradox of emancipation'.