Abstract
In the naturalistic decision-making literature, intuitive cognition is at the heart of a pattern recognition–based decision model called the recognition-primed decision model. Given the importance of intuitive cognition in naturalistic decision-making theory, we explore the question of what makes intuitive cognition effective for decision making and, in so doing, present an extended empirical and theoretical foundation for the intuitive component in naturalistic decision making. We theorize that intuitive cognition is effective because it (1) possesses a capability for grounded, situational meaning making (sign interpretation); (2) is operative over extended work intervals involving interruptions; and (3) is instrumental in handling situated complexities of everyday living. Other characteristics of intuitive cognition and its foundations are discussed. We propose that intuitive cognition represents the core of cognition—grounded, situational meaning making—whereas analytical cognition represents a form of an intellectual exoskeleton that provides added capabilities (e.g., working memory).
Subject
Applied Psychology,Engineering (miscellaneous),Computer Science Applications,Human Factors and Ergonomics
Cited by
21 articles.
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