Accountability in Central and Eastern Europe: concept and reality

Abstract

This article deals with accountability in EU new member states (the EU-10). First, the different meanings of the concept of accountability are reviewed. Second, accountability in the EU-10 is analysed in terms of three theoretical perspectives (accountability deficits, overloads and traps). Then the specificity of the accountability regime in the EU-10 is discussed as well as its possible explanations. It is argued that the accountability regime in the EU-10 is characterized by discrepancy between the formal existence of many accountability mechanisms and their actual performance (‘sleeping accountability’). This might be explained by the context in which accountability mechanisms are embedded (the high level of corruption, clientelism, low level of trust), frequent changes in political representation and public administration and the lack of knowledgeable and impartial accountees. The article concludes with implications for empirical comparative research and theory-building. Points for practitioners Accountability is one of the most important public administration concepts, but its empirical investigation is underdeveloped, especially in Central and Eastern European countries. Empirical research must be led by propositions that have practical relevance. Three such propositions – the accountability deficit, overload and asymmetry – are suggested. This includes considering the broader contexts in which accountability is embedded, analysing accountability relations over time, and carefully distinguishing between de jure and de facto accountability.