Cross-border Threats, Reputational Costs and the Evolution of an Authoritarian Club: The Case of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation

Abstract

This article adopted a repeated stag hunt game-theoretic model to explain the evolution of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). It shows that the degree of state cooperation with the SCO relates positively to the expected benefits of legitimate suppression of domestic unrest, to the material and reputational costs of enforcing anti-human rights norms, to the continuation of the three evils and to the tolerance for other members’ occasional betrayal. The SCO thus faces a dilemma. On the one hand, to sustain cooperation, it supports authoritarian leaders’ suppression of political dissidents. On the other hand, the SCO’s norms hostile towards human rights violate established international standards, thereby increasing the potential costs of mutual support. China’s global hunt for Uyghurs, the extension of membership, and Russia’s aggression in the region raise potential costs and harm the mutual trust within the SCO. These factors may gradually undermine leaders’ willingness to support the SCO.