Self-interest and high command rivalries in combined operations on Martinique and Guadeloupe, 1808–1811

Abstract

In 1808 the French Islands of Martinique and Guadeloupe represented the last threat to British colonial interests in the West Indies. Strategic concerns were not, however, the driving force behind British combined naval–military operations to capture them. Professional and financial gain were the primary motives for the officers in charge, Rear Admiral Sir Alexander Cochrane and General Sir George Beckwith, as they debated fleet and troop dispositions for attacks on the islands. The chance to seize prizes, booty, and valuable appointments to colonial offices on captured territory played a large part in the formulation of plans, although changes to both the strategic situation in the region and the metropolitan–colonial relationship threatened their prospects. This article examines Cochrane and Beckwith's efforts to maintain autonomy in the face of stricter government oversight, sufficient to achieve their personal ambitions.