Parliaments, constitutional conventions, and popular sovereignty

Abstract

There is growing interest in the United Kingdom in holding a constitutional convention (CC) to deliberate possible reforms to the political system. What form should a CC take? Having identified a range of possible models, we examine their merits according to stated normative criteria, focusing specifically on (1) how CC membership is determined, (2) whether a CC should have agenda-setting power and (3) whether it should have power to send proposals to binding referendum. We find good reasons to support a ‘citizen majority’ membership (chosen in a near-random fashion from the general public), agenda-setting power and referendum power. However, none of these features is likely to be the most appropriate in all contexts. Further design issues concerning citizen-majority conventions, such as whether they ought to include politicians as a minority or exclude them, are also considered. While the immediate focus of discussion is the United Kingdom, the core argument has wider relevance.